Doctrine of Last Seen in Nigerian Criminal Law

Published on: August 24, 2026

Introduction

The doctrine of last seen is an important principle of circumstantial evidence applied in Nigerian homicide cases. It becomes relevant where the deceased was last seen alive in the company of the accused and was subsequently found dead or disappeared in circumstances suggesting death.

The doctrine is based on the ordinary inference that a person who was last seen with the deceased may possess peculiar knowledge of what happened to the deceased. The court may therefore require the accused to explain how the deceased met his or her death.

However, the doctrine is not a substitute for proof beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution must still establish the essential ingredients of the offence and must prove, by credible evidence, that the accused was in fact the last person seen with the deceased. The doctrine cannot properly operate on suspicion, assumption or an uncertain chain of events.

Meaning of the Doctrine

The Supreme Court explained the doctrine in Igabele v. State, where the deceased, a conductor, left with the appellant, a driver, on a work trip and was never seen alive again. The Court treated the fact that the deceased was last seen with the appellant, together with the appellant’s conflicting explanations and the discovery of the deceased’s mutilated body, as powerful circumstantial evidence.

The doctrine was described as creating an inference that the person last seen with the deceased bears responsibility for the death, particularly where that person fails to provide a satisfactory explanation.

Similarly, in Hayatu Umar v. The State, the Supreme Court stated that where A was last seen alive in the company of B and subsequently disappeared or was found dead, the circumstances may call upon B to explain what happened. The Court held that the doctrine is especially relevant where the interval between the last sighting and the death or disappearance is sufficiently close and other evidence supports the inference.

In Atiku Abubakar Galadima v. The State, the Supreme Court restated that the doctrine is a judicially developed principle, rather than a statutory provision. The Court explained that it creates a rebuttable inference against the person last seen with the deceased, but does not operate automatically or independently of the surrounding facts.

The Prosecution’s Burden Remains Unchanged

A central limitation of the doctrine is that it does not completely transfer the burden of proof to the accused.

The prosecution must first prove:

that the deceased is dead;
that the deceased was last seen alive with the accused;
that the death resulted from the act or omission of the accused; and
that the act was intentional, or was done with knowledge that death or grievous bodily harm was its probable consequence.

In Ijeoma Anyasodor v. The State, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the burden of proving a criminal charge remains on the prosecution. It further recognized three accepted methods of proving guilt:

eyewitness testimony;
a voluntary confessional statement; and
circumstantial evidence.

The prosecution may rely on the last-seen circumstance as part of its circumstantial case, but it must still establish a complete chain of evidence connecting the accused to the death.

Thus, the accused’s duty is best understood as an evidential duty to explain an incriminating circumstance, not a legal duty to prove innocence. The constitutional presumption of innocence remains relevant throughout the trial.

Last Seen as Circumstantial Evidence

The doctrine is not independent evidence of the act of killing. Rather, it is a circumstance from which an inference may be drawn.

The Supreme Court in Igabele v. State emphasised that circumstantial evidence must be:

cogent;
complete;
unequivocal;
compelling; and
incompatible with the innocence of the accused.

It must lead to the irresistible conclusion that the accused, and no other person, committed the offence.

In that case, the last-seen circumstance was supported by several additional facts:

the appellant and deceased left together;
the deceased did not return;
the appellant gave conflicting explanations;
the appellant disappeared for a period;
the deceased’s mutilated body was later discovered; and
medical evidence contradicted the appellant’s explanation that the deceased died after falling from a moving vehicle.

It was the combination of these facts—not merely the last sighting—that sustained the conviction.

Application in Ijeoma Anyasodor v. The State

In Ijeoma Anyasodor v. The State, the appellant was in a relationship with the deceased. The prosecution’s evidence showed that the deceased spent time with the appellant shortly before he was attacked by hired gunmen. The appellant was present at the scene and was alleged to have arranged the attack.

The Supreme Court upheld the conviction based on a combination of direct and circumstantial evidence. The Court accepted that the appellant was the last person in the company of the deceased before the attack and that the surrounding evidence showed she had arranged the killing.

The case demonstrates that the doctrine may apply even where the accused did not personally inflict the fatal injury. A person who counsels, procures or facilitates the commission of the offence may still be criminally liable where the evidence establishes participation in the killing.

The importance of Anyasodor is therefore twofold:

last-seen evidence may form part of a circumstantial case; and
the accused need not be the person who physically caused the injury if the evidence establishes participation in the killing.

The Court nevertheless cautioned that circumstantial evidence must be carefully scrutinised because it may be fabricated or exaggerated to implicate an innocent person.

Application in Igabele v. State

Igabele v. State remains one of the leading Nigerian authorities on the doctrine.

The deceased left with the appellant, who was his driver, and was not seen alive thereafter. The appellant later gave inconsistent accounts. At different times, he suggested that the deceased had disembarked to visit a brother and that he had fallen from the moving vehicle. He could not identify the place where the alleged accident occurred and failed to report the incident.

The Court held that, in the circumstances, the appellant had peculiar knowledge of what happened to the deceased. His failure to provide a credible explanation strengthened the prosecution’s circumstantial case.

The case also confirms that:

an eyewitness to the killing is not indispensable;
a murder charge may be proved by circumstantial evidence;
minor discrepancies in prosecution evidence are not necessarily fatal; and
the court must not rely on speculation but must draw its conclusions from proved facts.

The Court’s reasoning was not that every person last seen with a deceased is automatically guilty. Rather, the decisive consideration was that the complete evidence pointed to the appellant and excluded other reasonable explanations.

Application in Hayatu Umar v. The State

In Hayatu Umar v. The State, the deceased was last seen riding on a camel with the appellant. The deceased was later found dead, and the camel had disappeared.

The evidence also included:

the appellant’s repeated visits to the deceased’s house;
evidence that the appellant took the deceased away;
the discovery of the body in the direction in which the appellant and deceased had travelled;
an injury to the deceased’s neck;
the disappearance of the camel; and
a confessional statement which the appellant later retracted.

The Supreme Court held that the retracted confession could be considered alongside the other evidence. The last-seen circumstance, the physical injury and the disappearance of the camel corroborated material aspects of the confession.

The Court identified six useful questions for testing the reliability of a confessional statement:

Is there anything outside the confession showing that it is true?
Is it corroborated?
Are the facts stated in it capable of being tested?
Did the accused have the opportunity to commit the offence?
Is the confession possible?
Is it consistent with other established facts?

Hayatu Umar therefore illustrates how the doctrine may operate together with a confession and other corroborative circumstances.

The Recent Authority: Atiku Abubakar Galadima v. The State

In Atiku Abubakar Galadima v. The State, SC/CR/1064/2024, decided by the Supreme Court on 10 July 2026, the Court considered the doctrine in the context of culpable homicide punishable with death under section 221(b) of the Sokoto State Penal Code.

The deceased, Barrister Surajo Abubakar, was last seen alive when the appellant took him away on a motorcycle. The deceased’s body was later found at Dundaye Village. The appellant admitted that he had taken the deceased to the area but claimed that they had a disagreement and that he left him there.

The prosecution relied on the following circumstances:

the appellant took the deceased away;
the deceased was not seen alive again;
the body was later found in the same general area;
the appellant gave misleading information about the deceased’s whereabouts;
he fled when questioned by the deceased’s family; and
he remained away for approximately four years.

The Supreme Court upheld the conviction. It held that the appellant had not provided a satisfactory account of how he and the deceased parted company or what happened afterwards. His conduct, considered together with the location of the body and the other evidence, completed the circumstantial chain.

The case is significant because it confirms that the doctrine:

is judicially developed;
creates a rebuttable evidential inference;
requires proof that the accused was truly the last person seen with the deceased;
must be supported by the surrounding circumstances; and
does not eliminate the prosecution’s obligation to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt.

The decision also demonstrates the relevance of post-event conduct, such as false explanations and prolonged flight, although such conduct must be assessed carefully and in context.

The Limitation in The State v. Chinedu Ekuma

The strongest warning against overusing the doctrine appears in The State v. Chinedu Ekuma.

In that case, the prosecution alleged that the respondent and others had attacked and handed the deceased over to persons from Benue State. The deceased was never found, and there was no direct evidence establishing that the respondent was the last person to see him alive.

The Supreme Court upheld the acquittal. It held that the prosecution had not established the death of the deceased or sufficiently connected the respondent with the alleged killing. The evidence also disclosed other possible persons who might have had custody of the deceased after the alleged handover.

The Court therefore rejected the application of the last-seen doctrine. In particular, the evidence did not establish:

that the respondent was the last person with the deceased;
that the deceased was certainly dead;
that the respondent had exclusive control over the deceased; or
that the circumstances excluded other reasonable hypotheses.

The State v. Chinedu Ekuma is important because it shows that:

Mere contact with the deceased, or evidence that the accused was among persons who had earlier encountered the deceased, is not sufficient to trigger the doctrine.

The prosecution must prove a real and sufficiently proximate last sighting, not simply prior association.

Conditions for Proper Application

From the authorities, the following conditions emerge.

1. The last sighting must be proved

The prosecution must establish through credible evidence that the accused was the last person seen with the deceased alive.

This fact should not be based on speculation, hearsay or an uncertain reconstruction of events.

2. The relationship must be sufficiently proximate

The interval between the last sighting and the discovery of the death or disappearance is relevant. The shorter and more proximate the interval, the stronger the inference may become.

However, there is no universal fixed period. The court must consider the facts of each case.

3. The accused should have peculiar knowledge

The doctrine is strongest where the accused had exclusive or substantially greater knowledge of the deceased’s movements after the last sighting.

If several other persons had equal access to the deceased, the inference against the accused may be weak.

4. The accused’s explanation must be assessed

A false, contradictory, evasive or inherently improbable explanation may strengthen the prosecution’s case. Conversely, a credible explanation showing that the deceased parted from the accused safely may rebut the inference.

5. Other circumstances should support the inference

The court should consider evidence such as:

recovery of the body or remains;
injuries consistent with the prosecution’s theory;
possession of the deceased’s property;
disappearance of relevant items;
false statements;
flight;
motive;
threats;
forensic evidence;
confessional statements; and
conduct before or after the death.

6. Alternative hypotheses must be excluded

The court must ask whether another reasonable explanation exists. If the evidence is equally consistent with the accused’s innocence, the accused must receive the benefit of the doubt.

Last Seen and Absence of the Body

The absence of a body does not necessarily prevent a conviction for murder.

As recognised in The State v. Chinedu Ekuma, a murder conviction may in principle be sustained without production of the corpse where compelling circumstantial evidence proves that the deceased was killed. However, the fact of death must itself be proved with sufficient certainty.

The absence of a body becomes particularly significant where:

the prosecution cannot establish the identity of the deceased;
there is no reliable evidence of death;
the deceased may still be alive;
the accused’s alleged confession is equivocal; or
other persons may have taken custody of the deceased.

Therefore, the last-seen doctrine cannot be used to cure a fundamental failure to prove that the deceased is dead.

Distinction Between Legal and Evidential Burden

Some judicial formulations state that the doctrine places an “onus” on the accused to explain the death. This expression must be understood carefully.

The legal burden of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt remains on the prosecution. The accused does not have to prove innocence.

What may arise is an evidential burden: once the prosecution proves strong facts showing that the accused was the last person with the deceased and that the circumstances are suspicious, the accused may reasonably be expected to offer an explanation. If the accused gives no explanation, or gives one that is false or inherently improbable, the court may take that failure into account.

This distinction is consistent with the reasoning in Igabele, Anyasodor, Hayatu Umar, and Atiku Abubakar Galadima, when read alongside the limiting decision in The State v. Chinedu Ekuma.

Conclusion

The doctrine of last seen is a valuable evidential principle in Nigerian criminal law, especially in homicide cases where there is no eyewitness to the killing. It permits the court to draw an inference from the fact that the deceased was last seen alive with the accused.

The leading authorities establish that the doctrine may support a conviction where:

the last-seen fact is proved;
the accused had peculiar knowledge of what happened;
the accused’s explanation is absent, false or unsatisfactory;
the deceased’s death is proved; and
the entire circumstantial evidence forms a complete and irresistible chain pointing to the accused.

At the same time, The State v. Chinedu Ekuma supplies an essential safeguard. The doctrine does not apply merely because the accused knew, met or had contact with the deceased. Nor does it relieve the prosecution of proving death, causation and the required intention beyond reasonable doubt.

The correct principle is therefore this:

The fact that an accused person was last seen with the deceased may raise a powerful and rebuttable evidential inference, but it can sustain a conviction only where the totality of the evidence forms a cogent, complete and compelling chain that excludes every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence.